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1        Introduction  
In this paper, my focus will be on some central aspects of Jenefer 
Robinson’s influential work ‘Deeper than Reason’, more specifically 
on the role our emotional responses play in art appreciation and the 
value attributed to the ensuing emotional experience. Whereas 
Robinson argues (1) that bodily responses, and our awareness of 
these bodily changes, can provide us with information relevant to the 
appreciation of artworks, and (2) that in some cases affective 
empathy is necessary to artistic understanding, I want to raise two 
concerns about whether this position holds for artworks conveying 
self-conscious emotions.1 Such emotions are of particular interest in 
this context since, in the first place, self-conscious emotions can, in 
fact, be experienced without moving us physiologically in a full-
fledged sense. These higher cognitive emotions, also known as non-
primary or intellectual emotions—including guilt, shame, 
embarrassment, pride, or nostalgia—are not automatically triggered 
 
1 Even though higher cognitive emotions have traditionally received considerably 
less attention from emotion researchers than the so-called basic emotions such as 
joy, fear, and sadness, there has been a significant increase in research on higher 
cognitive emotions in recent years. See, for example, the edited collection by Tracy, 
Robins, & Tangney 2007 and Stocker 2010. 
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but require self-evaluation. And, unlike the basic emotions, they are 
also believed to lack stereotypical expressive or behavioural 
features.2 Second, self-conscious emotions are unavailable to 
affective empathy since they are known for involving self-directed 
cognition.3 As we will see, it is this tight connection to the self—
where the ‘self’ is both the subject and the particular object of the 
emotion—which makes it difficult to take the emotional perspective 
of another person.  
My strategy will be to question the weight Robinson places 
on bodily feelings and affective empathy by bringing Peter Goldie’s 
theory of emotions into play. To that end, I will discuss a particular 
self-conscious emotion that Robinson’s model is unable to 
accommodate within her two-step theory of emotions: 
autobiographical or reflective nostalgia. I take this kind of nostalgia 
to be not a mere deliberate fantasy about the past (e.g. the longing for 
a non-lived period of history like a retro-nostalgia for the decade of 
the fifties), but an emotion concerned with the irrevocability of one’s 
own past.4 The artworks I propose to look at in order to develop my 
claim are the avant-garde films by Jonas Mekas, ‘Reminiscences of a 
Journey to Lithuania’ (1972) and ‘As I Was Moving Ahead 
Occasionally I Saw Brief Glimpses of Beauty’ (2000).5 These 
autobiographical films, also known as ‘film-diaries’, will enable us to 
discuss the possibility of a model of art appreciation that includes 
emotions that do not require bodily feelings. At the same time, 
Mekas’ characteristic style of presenting a collage of images about his 
 
2 Tracey & Robins 2007, pp. 6–7. 
3 For more on the object of self-conscious emotions, see Tracey & Robins 2004. 
4 See Boym 2001, Van Tilburg, Wildschut & Sedikides 2018 for a characterisation of 
nostalgia as a self-conscious emotion. 
5 Although Robinson’s artistic examples are mainly focused on her areas of 
expertise—literature and music—her theory has the potential to be expanded to 
other art forms. Here I propose film, a medium classically focused on emotions, as 
a candidate that can benefit from this discussion. See Smith 2017, for a recent 
analysis of Robinson’s work on emotions in a philosophy of film framework. 
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everyday life while offering his own poetic observations on what the 
viewer is watching will allow me to show why fellow-feeling is not the 
appropriate way of engaging with artworks of this type—what I shall 
discuss below as ‘intellectual artworks’. I will suggest that the 
nostalgic view from which Mekas’ film-diaries are narrated presents 
problems for perspective-shifting, a necessary process in empathetic 
responses, according to Robinson. The reason for this lies in the 
impossibility of sharing the particular object of the nostalgic emotion 
expressed in these experimental films—something desirable and 
unrecoverable from Mekas’ past.6 The memories presented by the 
Lithuanian filmmaker are to be understood as a personal self-
evaluation of the director’s past, and, as an invitation to reflect on 
one’s personal story, not as an emotional episode to be felt on Mekas’ 
behalf. I will conclude that the value of artworks expressing such self-
reflective states is, first and foremost, an epistemic one. This is a 
value bound up with the aesthetic features of the artwork but not 
reducible to its artistic value (at least if the latter is narrowly 
construed). Note that this paper should not be perceived as a 
rejection of feeling as an important part of our artistic experiences, 
but as a reconsideration of its role and function.  
 
2        Emotional Understanding 
How much do we need to feel in order to be able to appreciate 
aesthetically? 
 
This section highlights the intricate relation between cognition and 
feeling in our emotional responses to art. I will show that certain 
emotions towards artworks do not seem to operate in the way 
Robinson describes. The emotions I have in mind do not, it seems, 
occur as the result of a non-cognitive affective appraisal of our 
 
6 Howard 2012, p. 641. 
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environment, as Robinson suggests, but instead appear to call for 
some kind of conscious self-evaluation at the very moment of their 
experience. My argument will reveal that Robinson’s analysis suffers 
from being developed primarily with emotional bodily feelings as a 
model and does not sufficiently take into account the distinction 
between being emotional, on the one hand, and having an emotion, 
on the other hand. For that reason, what I want to put forward here is 
a view of art appreciation inspired by Goldie’s theory of emotions,  
where there are emotional feelings of a kind that 
can be directed immediately towards objects in 
the world beyond the bounds of the body: these 
feelings are bound up with cognition and 
perception, and are not the mere effects of 
cognition or perception.7  
One of Robinson’s main claims in ‘Deeper than Reason’ is that in 
some cases our emotional responses are means towards artistic 
understanding. To use Robinson’s own words, “cognition without 
emotion simply does not do a good job”.8 On this account, in order to 
gain an appropriate understanding of an artwork – that is, not only of 
the particular emotional state expressed but of the overall point of 
view of the work—we need to be able to attend to the bodily feelings 
related to the emotional experience of the artwork. As Robinson puts 
it: 
Emotional understanding is in the first instance a 
kind of bodily understanding: my affective 
appraisals of characters, events, and situations are 
automatic and instinctive, and they immediately 
 
7 Goldie 2009, p. 232. 
8 Robinson 2010, p. 80. 
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produce physiological and behavioural responses 
that reinforce these emotional appraisals.9  
This defence of the importance of bodily feelings in our artistic 
experiences is in tune with the portrayal Robinson gives of emotions 
outside of art appreciation. Her model, in a nutshell, is characterised 
by identifying an emotion as a non-cognitive appraisal of our 
environment—that is, an automatic and instinctive evaluation—
which causes a bodily response in us (e.g. physiological changes, 
tendencies to act, and expressive gestures).10 This bodily reaction 
helps the subject to focus attention upon those things in the 
environment that matter to her. Robinson adds a second step to her 
model to ensure the evaluative appropriateness of our bodily 
response when she claims that this affective appraisal that is 
experienced subjectively as a feeling subsequently has to be modified 
by cognitive monitoring, or reflection.11 In a similar sense, emotions 
for Robinson are a useful tool for artistic criticism because they serve 
the double function of, first, alerting us to what is of significance and, 
second, preparing us to critically evaluate these initial responses. For 
example, my weeping for a character like Anna Karenina works as an 
inarticulate understanding of the events read about, and it is by 
evaluating this initial response that I develop my aesthetic 
appreciation of the novel.12 In addition, it is when we experience 
these artistic emotions and reflect upon them that we also come to 
gain a deeper understanding about the artwork. As Robinson 
declares:  
If I laugh and cry, shiver, tense, and relax in all the 
“right” places, then I have in some sense 
 
9 Robinson 2005, p. 127. 
10 For a complete description of the account, see Chapter 3 in Robinson 2005, pp. 
57–99. 
11 Ibid., pp. 75–9. 
12 Ibid., p. 123. 
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understood the story.
 
But if I want not just to have 
a rich emotional experience while reading the 
novel but also to give a critical account—a 
“reading” or an “interpretation”—of it, this 
requires reflecting on my emotional experience. I 
need to reflect upon my affective appraisals, figure 
out what they were, what it was in the story that 
provoked them, and whether they were justified.13  
However, for Robinson not every artwork needs to be emotionally 
understood in order to be appropriately appreciated. There are some 
artworks that she excludes from the process of emotional 
understanding, namely those she describes as being about ‘ideas’. 
These artworks, she states, demand to be experienced on an 
‘intellectual’ level, not on an emotional level.14 In her own words: 
Different kinds of artworks have very different 
goals. Some are mainly concerned with design or 
form. Others deal mainly with ideas and demand 
to be appreciated primarily on an intellectual 
level. I am not arguing that all artworks have to be 
experienced emotionally if they are to count as 
art.15 
Against Robinson, I believe that these intellectual artworks she refers 
to should also be experienced emotionally. The only difference is that 
the emotions we engage with in these cases tend to be what are 
commonly referred to as higher cognitive emotions. Now, the heart 
of the matter here is Robinson’s refusal to call ‘emotions’ those 
emotional feelings that do not seem to involve awareness of any 
 
13 Robinson 2010, p. 77. 
14 Robinson 2005, p. 102. 
15 Ibid., p. 102. 
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particular bodily change or state. An important part of Robinson’s 
motivation for prioritising bodily feelings is the fact that her neo-
Jamesian account is built on a base of solely the basic emotions 
(anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, disgust). William James, in 
‘What is an Emotion?’, famously describes self-conscious emotions as 
non-standard or purely cerebral, and gives hardly any attention to 
them, because emotions without bodily feelings are, for him, ‘only 
judgements’. The main difference between standard emotions and 
non-standard, or ‘intellectual’ emotions, is that “the bodily 
sounding—board, vibrating in the one case, is in the other mute”.16 
Robinson, following James’ lead, also gives a problematic and, in 
some sense at least, counterintuitive characterisation of ‘cold’ 
emotions when she argues that, for example, a lack of bodily feelings 
during reflection on our remembrances, in the case of nostalgia, 
prevents nostalgia from having the status of an emotion. In 
Robinson’s view: 
If I wish I were young again and in the Paris of 
yesteryear, then we may say that I am nostalgic for 
Paris, even if I am not making any non-cognitive 
appraisal and I am physiologically unmoved. I am 
not experiencing an emotional response to (my 
thoughts of) Paris. We can call my state an 
“emotion of nostalgia” if we like, but this is 
misleading because there is no “emotionality” or 
emotional upheaval.17 
My main worry, then, is that, by identifying emotions with individual 
bodily feelings felt at a specific time, Robinson’s model seems to be 
excluding from the process of art appreciation, a set of emotions that 
are familiar to us in life and in the arts. In other words, this model 
 
16 James 1884, p. 202. 
17 Robinson 2005, p. 95. 
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excludes those emotions that are partly constituted by cognitive 
processes that unfold over time and which require attention to the 
personal history of a person; such as my case study, nostalgia, but 
also grief, shame, envy, pride, etc. Furthermore, the cognitive 
monitoring or reflective, second-step, which is of vital importance for 
Robinson’s account of the epistemic value of emotions, is something 
I find problematic since it seems to go against Robinson’s refusal to 
afford higher cognitive emotions the status of really being emotions. 
One could think that these emotions, especially the self-conscious 
type, would hold a privileged position in Robinson’s account, since 
they do not need to be subsequently cognitively recognised in order 
to warrant the appropriateness of the bodily feeling; but as we have 
seen, this is not the case. What we need, then, is an account of 
emotions and of art appreciation utilising a unified concept of 
emotion that does justice to the particularities of both the basic and 
the higher cognitive emotions. One way of giving a better 
characterisation of cognitive complex emotions is by adopting 
Goldie’s useful distinction between bodily feelings and feeling 
towards.18 Goldie’s theory, like Robinson’s, posits a close 
identification between emotion and feeling, but contrary to 
Robinson’s model, with the notion of feeling towards Goldie can 
make sense of feelings that do not involve any characteristic 
physiological change. This notion would also explain distinctive 
emotional episodes where bodily feeling is involved and yet the 
feeling is not always present. In Goldie’s words: 
I think it is possible to do justice to the 
importance of feelings in emotional experience 
without needing to claim either that emotions 
must involve feelings at all times, or that, for each 
type of emotional experience, there will be a 
 
18 See Goldie 2009. 
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distinctive phenomenology which is uniquely 
identifiable with it.19 
In what follows, with the help of Jonas Mekas’ naturalistic films, I try 
to show how the notion of feeling towards allows for a different 
understanding of the role of emotions in our appreciation of 
artworks, especially when assessing the value of artworks that deal 
with ideas. In ‘As I Was Moving Ahead Occasionally I Saw Brief 
Glimpses of Beauty’, which is made of fragments of homemade films 
recorded over a period of about thirty years, we see the everyday lives 
of Mekas’ family and friends. Here, no strong bodily feelings are 
elicited; instead, we find pleasure in the contemplation of past 
events, in the ambiance of the film, in ordinary but meaningful 
situations like weddings, picnics, or family reunions, all of them 
depicted in an intimate and subtle way.20 This film sets the spectator 
in a reflective mood by inviting her to experience a kind of nostalgic 
feeling that goes beyond the boundaries of the body. Mekas’ films are 
an example of artworks that might have associated feelings, but 
which do not have associated bodily feelings or behavioural 
dispositions.21 When engaging with them we come to judge them as 
evocative, poignant, or consoling, and we do this by identifying 
precise artistic choices, and without necessarily being physiologically 
moved by them. For example, we recognise the calm piano that 
accompanies Mekas’ own voice, the collage-montage, or the 
exploitation of silence as elements that infuse this work with 
 
19 Goldie 2000, p. 69. 
20 Ruoff 1991, p. 14. 
21 Jesse Prinz discusses how there are some emotions that do not have observable 
behavioural dispositions; nostalgia being one of these. “It may be difficult to link 
some emotions with specific behaviors (e.g. hope, pride, aesthetic pleasure, 
confusion, nostalgia, and so on). It may be that some named emotions can impact 
behavior in a variety of different ways, and it may also turn out that some emotions 
are not associated with highly specific biologically prepared behavioral responses” 
(2012, p. 202). 
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nostalgia. Likewise, the themes of the film–childhood memories, 
immigrant identity, the reconstruction of a personal self–contribute 
to setting the spectator in a self-evaluative state. Whereas for 
Robinson bodily feelings are directed towards the body and the 
awareness of these bodily changes help the appreciator to scan and 
detect the important aspects of the artwork, feeling towards can help 
the appreciator to take certain aspects present in the artwork under 
the ‘appropriate light’. Hence, from a Goldiean view the relevance of 
feelings in appreciation is not about being causally moved by 
features of an artwork, but has to do with acquiring the ‘right’ 
phenomenology required for correctly judging the aesthetic features 
present in the work. For example, in Mekas’ film, where “the restless 
handheld camera and the rapid montage never holds enough on any 
image to fix it in our mind”, the viewer will only perceive these 
images as memories if she is able to pick up the phenomenal 
character of the nostalgic emotion in place.22 So, contra Robinson, I 
would suggest that the emotionality of the artistic experience is 
revealed in the way we perceive the artwork. This means that our 
emotional responses towards artworks are bound up with cognition 
and perception, and are not the mere effects of cognition or 
perception.23 In other words, having an emotional experience of an 
artwork does not exhaust our understanding of the artwork, but what 
is relevant about emotions is that they can provide us with a deeper 
understanding of the relevant aesthetic features present in an 
artwork. And from there, once we have the appropriate phenomenal 
experience it is more likely that we acquire an appropriate 
judgement of the artwork.  
I agree with Robinson that in our engagement with certain 
artworks we tend to scream or at least flinch when a monster appears 
on screen, or to weep at the end of a sentimental film. That said, 
 
22 Rouff 1991, p. 16. 
23 For Goldie’s discussion on how non-cognitivism gets ‘phenomenology’ wrong, see 
Goldie 2009, pp. 235-6. 
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emotional bodily feelings are not the only feelings we can 
experience. Mekas’ films show that in artistic contexts we can also be 
drawn to experiment with subtle or more cognitively complex 
emotions. In these cases, what we will typically be engaging with are 
things grasped with the mind, such as thoughts and memories. It is 
the automaticity of responses to art such as tears, screams, or laughs, 
that leads Robinson to propose that the comprehension of our 
responses, and of the artwork itself, comes after the evaluation of 
their appropriateness. The reason for this is that no degree of bodily 
feeling can by itself reveal what our emotions are about,  and that is 
why Robinson’s model needs a second step, lest she merely be 
discussing a subjective feeling.24 The point I am making here is that 
emotions like the nostalgia expressed in Mekas’ ‘film-diaries’ do not 
require this second moment because they are by nature partly 
constituted by reflection. I do not mean to say with this that we do 
not also reflect upon our self-conscious emotions and come back to 
analyse what made us respond in such a way. We can attend to what 
we felt when experiencing a reflective emotion and evaluate the 
appropriateness of our emotional response to the artwork, but, as I 
understand it, for Robinson, cognitive monitoring is a necessary step 
to justify not only the emotion’s appropriateness with the artwork 
but the emotion itself.  
My central idea in this section can be described as follows: 
whilst artworks typically require an emotional response, not every 
artwork requires an emotional bodily response—think of 
abstraction, conceptual art, experimental film, or post-modern 
literature. These types of artworks, which do not elicit bodily 
responses in us, are normally signified as ‘cerebral’ or about ‘ideas 
directed to the mind’. I believe that these tags are problematic since 
they leave intellectual emotions out of the art appreciative process. 
Therefore, Robinson might consider adapting her account if she 
wants to be able to accommodate artworks involving higher 
 
24 On this see Goldie 2000, p. 58. 
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cognitive emotions, but also, I claim, if she wants to be able to do 
justice to a general insight that has arisen from recent philosophy of 
emotions, namely the thought that cognition and feeling are not 
distinct or easily separable.  
The reflective emotions I have been discussing might not be 
vividly felt in an automatic way, but in this section I hope to have 
shown how sometimes in the arts it is emotion without cognition 
that does not do a good job. 
 
 
3        Affective Empathy 
Which emotional perspective should we adopt in art appreciation? 
 
Recently, empathy has been accorded a central role in explaining our 
emotional involvement with fictional characters and events 
presented in a narrative.25 These empathetic responses are thought to 
be an intimate form of identification in which we come to make 
sense of another person’s emotions by imaginatively engaging with 
the person’s point of view. In this section, I challenge Robinson’s 
account and push her to take into consideration the limitations of 
perspective-taking as a tool for art appreciation when applied to self-
conscious emotions. Indeed, on many accounts empathy is seen as a 
valuable tool in the proper appreciation of artworks—including 
film.26 Robinson, for her part, defends the view that ‘high level’ 
affective empathy can be helpful for understanding the point of view 
from which an artwork is shaped, with this being especially true for 
novels, plays, and films that purport to depict ‘real life’ events.27 Also, 
 
25 One of the most important volumes on empathy is the edited collection by 
Coplan & Goldie 2011.  
26 See Smith 1995; Gaut 2010; Vaage 2009. 
27 Robinson 2005, p. 106. 
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it is through fellow-feeling that we gain access to key elements of 
appreciation like the theme, vision, and unity of the work.28 
 So, if we want to understand a character that we care about, 
like Anna Karenina, what we need to do is to imagine what is like to 
be in Anna’s situation, and we do this not only to understand her 
despair but also to acquire a fuller understanding of the work.  
 That said, the presumption that such affective empathy is 
possible might be seen as problematic when we apply it to self-
conscious emotions, which are bound up with a strong sense of self. 
So, while, for example, nostalgia typically involves a process of self-
evaluation and of self-awareness—you are nostalgic about your 
memories—fear and pity do not seem to be necessarily concerned 
with the self, but with external objects, such as green slimes or 
characters like Anna Karenina, respectively. And, even though 
Robinson does not want to generalise by asserting that ‘every 
emotional response to art is empathetic’, her notion of art 
appreciation does not provide us with a clear picture of which 
emotions or affective aspects of an artwork are to be empathetically 
understood and which not. I suspect that for Robinson’s account, 
those characters or events that we feel positively towards count as an 
invitation to be felt in an empathetic way (feeling Anna’s own 
sorrow), while those who we feel negatively towards are not to be 
emotionally understood in an empathetic manner (revulsion for 
Macbeth).29 This difficulty of feeling empathy for characters like 
Macbeth captures our imaginative resistance to adopting 
perspectives that go against our values or worldviews. For example, 
Alex Neill maintains that the success of empathic imagination is 
 
28 For Robinson, “fellow feeling is fellow feeling, not just an intellectual recognition 
that someone is in trouble, say, but a ‘gut reaction’ or compassion, an emotional or 
bodily response, a response consisting in autonomic and motor changes” (2010, pp. 
80–81). 
29 Robinson 2005, pp. 108–12. 
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dependent on how much the other is like myself.30 However, in the 
case of reflective emotions—where the self is part of the formal 
object of the emotion—the limit is not a problem of imagination or 
of possessing different psychological dispositions. I believe that the 
problem lies in the impossibility of accessing the particular object of 
another’s self-conscious emotion. Here there is no external 
perceptual recognition or imaginative access to the target of 
someone else’s emotion. In the case of nostalgia, we fail to 
intentionally imagine the other’s recollections in an empathetic way 
because the yearning associated with this emotion is inseparable 
from the subject’s self-evaluation of her own past. Furthermore, in 
order to experience nostalgia, we not only need to be aware of the 
event that is remembered by someone, we also need to have the 
correct phenomenal experience of the event. This is partly due to the 
fact that in order to experience nostalgia it must be the case that one 
has the feeling of being in a specific space, transported by one’s own 
memories. So even if nostalgia can be triggered by external objects 
perceptually recognisable by all, it is the personal connection with 
this object to someone’s autobiography that sets off the emotion. It is 
this narrative sense of self that makes self-conscious emotions 
peculiarly resistant to empathy. 
Along similar lines, authors like Noël Carroll, Peter Goldie, 
and Peter Lamarque believe that the difficulty of perspective-shifting 
lies in the different informational and evaluative positions between 
the audience and the characters involved.31 Goldie understands that 
this problem is not a contingent one that has to do with imaginative 
limits, but a conceptual one, because perspective-shifting usurps the 
‘full-blooded notion of first-personal agency that is involved in 
deliberation’.32 Therefore, putting it more crudely, self-conscious 
emotions seem to work as anti-empathetic states that need to be 
 
30 Neill 2006, p. 254. 
31 See Carroll 2011; Goldie 2000, 2011; Lamarque 2011. 
32 Goldie 2011, p. 303. 
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experienced from one’s personal perspective.  33 Let’s go back to 
Mekas’ example to get a better sense of what I am suggesting. 
In ‘Reminiscences of a Journey to Lithuania’, made in the 
summer of 1971, we find the story of a displaced person who decides 
to go back to his home country after escaping from the Nazi 
occupation during the Second World War. This is the personal story 
of Jonas Mekas, a man in search of a home, who is in the process of 
reconfiguring his identity when the emotion of nostalgia appears. He 
feels profoundly nostalgic about his hometown, the Lithuanian 
village of Semeniskiai, and the family he had to leave behind. He 
longs for insignificant but meaningful things, like the taste of the 
water he used to drink from a well, or the old women that reminded 
him of ‘sad autumn birds’ when he was a child. From time to time, we 
hear the filmmaker’s voice reflecting on these scenes. And it is 
through Mekas’ delicate and painful descriptions of his own past 
experiences that we come to understand that his manner of valuing 
this document is very different from a spectator’s appreciation of the 
nostalgic work, even for someone like Mekas’ brother, who 
accompanied him in the process of making the film.34 This 
asymmetrical emotional response towards the film is noted by 
Tomkins when he declares that: 
[a]ccording to Adolfas, the trip was an intensely 
emotional experience for his brother, who broke 
down and wept several times when he was called 
on to say something before a gathering. Adolfas, 
three years younger than Jonas and completely at 
home in America, apparently was not subject to 
the same emotions. But for Jonas the trip seemed 
 
33 Thanks to Laura T. Di Summa for inviting me to put this in a more explicit way. 
34 Thanks to Paisley Livingston for his comments on this.  
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to confirm his long-standing suspicion that he has 
not yet found any place of his own in the world.35  
The impossibility of empathising with Mekas occurs not because his 
psychological states are alien to us—we all have nostalgic memories 
and the capacity to recollect those brief glimpses of beauty, but, 
contrary to what Robinson seems to be holding, because the 
artwork’s perspective is not something that we can, and more 
importantly should, attempt to match. What, then, is the appropriate 
emotional response to Jonas Mekas’ work? Although the 
embodiment of nostalgia in a personal narrative makes it 
inaccessible to us, at least if it is a question of our supposedly feeling 
the same way as the nostalgic subject, that does not mean we cannot 
be sensitive to it at all. So, even if the images we find in Mekas’ film-
diaries do not have the same meaning for, or connection with, the 
spectator, his work is still valuable to us because we are able to see 
his artistic intention of retelling the past as something familiar. It is 
just that our emotional responses will not be a pure autobiographical 
nostalgia like the one expressed by Jonas Mekas himself.  
Nevertheless, there are times in the viewing of Mekas’ films 
in which we can experience some kind of analogous but self-directed 
autobiographical nostalgia. This can be explained without appeal to 
empathy, but through memory association. This is an idea shared by 
Robinson when she states that we possess emotional memory.36 
According to Robinson, we store past emotional situations that help 
us to understand similar episodes as the ones presented in a novel or 
film. In Mekas’ case, the content of the film can trigger a nostalgic 
memory in us, and this is a pleasurable experience for the spectator 
because we tend to feel pleasure in what is familiar to us. It is this 
feeling of pleasure in the familiar but, more importantly, the capacity 
Mekas has for presenting the world as broken and beautiful which 
 
35 Tomkins 1973, p. 32. 
36 Robinson 2010, p. 74. 
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connects us to his story in an intense and unique way. So, the 
nostalgic experience of Mekas’ work does not reside in its capacity to 
be fellow felt (or experienced in a bodily way), but in how the 
aesthetic experience involving an acknowledgment of Mekas’ 
nostalgia can inform our knowledge of our own past.37  
An example is the moment in ‘As I Was Moving Ahead 
Occasionally I Saw Brief Glimpses of Beauty’ where we hear the 
filmmaker’s voice inviting us to create this intimate connection 
between his life and our own: 
I am looking at these images, now, many, many 
years later. I recognise and remember everything. 
What can I tell to you, what can I tell to you. No. 
No. These are images that have some meaning to 
me, but may have no meaning to you at all. Then, 
suddenly, this being midnight, I thought: there is 
no image that wouldn’t relate to anybody else. I 
mean, all the images around us, that we go 
through our lives, and I go filming them, they are 
not that much different from what you have seen 
or experienced [...] From what you have seen or 
experienced. All our lives are very, very much 
alike.38 
If Robinson’s theory specifies that art appreciation sometimes 
requires the appreciator to adopt the perspective from which a story 
is told, then it needs to give space to those emotions that require a 
strong sense of self and that are not readily imagined by another 
person. While I believe that she would urge us to try to imagine what 
it would be like to have lived Mekas’ life, I believe that the epistemic 
merit of Mekas’ film resides instead in its capacity to help us to 
 
37 My thanks to Jeremy Page for urging me to pursue this. 
38  Mekas 2013, p. 13. 
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understand our own personal past. And, as art appreciators, what we 
ought to assess is not only this invitation to reflect about the way we 
think about the past, but the way in which emotions are conveyed 
and crafted in Mekas’ experimental films.  
In this section, I have used Mekas’ autobiographical films—
and our responses to them—to challenge Robinson’s assertion that 
affective empathy has the potential to play an important role in our 
appreciation of artworks. I have focused on the self-conscious 
emotion of nostalgia, which, I argued in section one, Robinson’s 
account should accommodate as an emotion if she wants to do 
justice to our complex emotional life. As noted above, many 
commentators have suggested problems with the notion of affective 
empathy, and my contribution here consists in showing that self-
conscious emotions present a specific and unique challenge to 
accounts like Robinson’s because these emotions are tied to the 
subject’s sense of self and autobiographical self-understanding, 
something which we necessarily cannot share. The intimacy that 
Mekas reveals with his work is a personal invitation, or guide, to 
experience the world in a very specific way, with tenderness 
whenever childhood memories of his daughter are portrayed, 
wonder and amusement when images about their youth in 
Greenwich Village during the sixties appear on screen, or even with 
indignation when sad memories about WWII and his life as a 
displaced person are remembered. I believe that a possible path for 
Robinson to explore would be to think of our experience of self-
conscious emotions expressed in the arts as yielding an epistemic 
merit related to an enriched understanding of how emotions work. 
Asking us to share another’s emotions and the feelings based on 
them might be asking for too much. 
 
4        Conclusion  
In this paper, I have shown that we cannot explain all emotional 
cases using the two-step model defended by Robinson. Her theory of 
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emotions is problematic for those artistic cases where understanding 
and value do not reside in the capacity of the audience to bodily feel 
or imagine the same emotion expressed. As we have seen, not all 
emotions are either bodily feelings or instances of empathy. I have 
focused on the nature of self-conscious emotions, and in particular 
on the expression of autobiographical nostalgia in Jonas Mekas’ ‘film-
diaries’, in order to show how emotional feelings, in art appreciation, 
can be better understood if we adopt Goldie’s notion of feeling 
towards, instead of Robinson’s bodily feeling, especially in the case of 
‘intellectual’ artworks. I have also tried to assess the limitations of 
perspective-shifting in Robinson’s affective empathy when applied to 
reflective emotions that are tied to a strong sense of self. In Jonas 
Mekas’ work, the epistemic value of his films—and our appreciative 
response to them—comes not from bodily feeling the same nostalgic 
emotion expressed in his highly personal work, but from how the 
aesthetic experience involving an acknowledgment of his nostalgia 
can inform our knowledge of our own past. It is in this recognition 
that we understand Mekas’ exploration of private and subjective 
memories as something universal.39 
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